--- id: c9-resource-allocation-framework title: Resource Allocation Framework module: GROW-S9 module_slug: grow-s9-dao-governance cluster: Coordination type: policy version: v0.1.0 status: Gate-reviewed tier: membership contract_role: "" canonical_url: "https://grow.goodcombinator.ai/library/registry/c9-resource-allocation-framework" download_url: "https://grow.goodcombinator.ai/library/registry/c9-resource-allocation-framework.md" license: CC-BY-4.0 (proposed — owner confirmation required) source: GROW by Good Combinator retrieved_at: 2026-05-29 --- # Resource Allocation Framework The Resource Allocation Framework establishes the rules governing how a DAO's treasury is funded, held, segmented, disbursed, and recovered. It translates the `treasury-allocation` decision rights from `c9-decision-rights-matrix` into operating policy: budget ceilings per category, milestone gates that condition disbursement on delivered proof, retroactive-reward rules for contributors who delivered before a budget existed, and reserve floors that prevent the treasury from being voted to zero. A DAO without explicit treasury policy either hoards capital (proposal paralysis) or drains it opportunistically (governance capture). This framework closes both failure modes by making allocation rules machine-checkable, not a matter of interpretation at vote time. --- ## 1. Treasury Structure The treasury is segmented into tranches. Each tranche has a ceiling, a floor (reserve that may not be allocated), a governance class that unlocks it, and an evidence requirement for disbursement. ```yaml treasury: currency: total_balance_source: tranches: - id: label: purpose: ceiling_pct: reserve_floor_pct: period: decision_class_required: disbursement_gate: max_single_disbursement: ``` **Reserve rule:** The aggregate reserve floor across all tranches must total at least 20% of the treasury. No combination of passed proposals may reduce the treasury below the reserve floor in a single period. The Treasurer must reject execution of any disbursement that would breach the floor, even if the proposal passed; the correct path is a new proposal that accounts for the current balance. --- ## 2. Budget Categories and Ceilings The following standard categories apply. Instantiate with the specific tranche IDs and ceilings for the governed DAO. Categories that are not used in a period are not rolled over automatically; any carryover requires a `treasury-allocation` proposal. | Category | Purpose | Typical Ceiling | Decision Class | Gate Type | |---|---|---|---|---| | `infrastructure` | Physical and cloud infrastructure (servers, networking, hosting, sensors) | 30% of annual budget | `treasury-allocation` | Milestone | | `contributor-rewards` | Salaries, contractor fees, bounties for ongoing contributors | 35% of annual budget | `treasury-allocation` | Approval (recurring) | | `retroactive-rewards` | One-time rewards for past contributions | 10% of annual budget | `retroactive-reward` | Approval (no self-vote) | | `grants-and-partnerships` | Outbound grants, co-investment, partnership costs | 10% of annual budget | `platform-partnership` | Approval + Board gate | | `reserve-building` | Deliberate additions to the reserve floor | No ceiling | `treasury-allocation` | Automatic on pass | | `emergency` | Unforeseen obligations (legal, safety, critical repair) | 5% of annual budget | `emergency-ratification` | Immediate; retroactive vote within 24 hrs | | `governance-operations` | Tooling, audits, legal opinions for governance itself | 5% of annual budget | `treasury-allocation` | Approval | | `unallocated` | Funds not yet assigned to a category | Remainder | N/A (must be proposed) | N/A | --- ## 3. Milestone-Based Disbursement For infrastructure, large contributor rewards, and grants exceeding a defined threshold, funds are released in milestones rather than as a single disbursement. This prevents allocation of funds to work that is never delivered. ### 3a. Milestone Structure Each milestone-gated proposal defines: ```yaml proposal_id: total_amount: milestones: - id: label: deliverable: evidence_required: tranche_amount: tranche_pct: <% of total> reviewer: deadline: ``` ### 3b. Disbursement Trigger Rules - The Treasurer may not release a milestone tranche before the milestone reviewer signs off. Sign-off is recorded as a C11 event in `c9-execution-accountability`. - If a milestone is missed by its deadline, the unspent tranche reverts to the `unallocated` pool. The funded team may propose a new allocation for the remaining work; they may not extend the timeline unilaterally. - A proposal that fails to define specific, observable deliverables (e.g., "continue development") is rejected at the proposal-review gate (see `c9-proposal-design-template`). --- ## 4. Retroactive Rewards Retroactive rewards recognize contributions made before a formal budget existed or before a contributor was formally contracted. They prevent the DAO from free-riding on early work while maintaining the no-self-vote protection. **Eligibility rules:** 1. The contribution must have been delivered in full before the reward proposal is submitted. 2. The proposer must supply evidence of delivery (commit hashes, published work, recorded output, third-party confirmation). 3. The nominee must not vote on their own reward. The `c9-decision-rights-matrix` enforces this; any vote cast by the nominee's address is discarded from the tally. 4. The reward amount must be grounded in a stated rate or market benchmark. "We feel this is fair" is not sufficient evidence; a comparable rate table or prior approved comp structure is required. 5. No retroactive reward may exceed the `retroactive-rewards` tranche ceiling in a single period; proposals above that ceiling require a tranche-ceiling amendment via `treasury-allocation`. --- ## 5. Grant Income and External Funds When the DAO receives external funds (public grants, partnership revenue, donations), those funds must be classified before they can be allocated: | Source Type | Required Action | Restriction | |---|---|---| | Government grant | Record grant terms; flag restricted-use conditions | Restricted funds may only be allocated to purposes the grant permits; any reallocation requires grantor approval | | Partnership revenue share | Record partnership agreement; confirm revenue split | Allocate per partnership agreement terms before general treasury use | | Donation (unrestricted) | Record donor and amount; confirm no string attached | Enters general treasury; standard allocation process applies | | Donation (restricted) | Record donor intent; confirm governance acceptance | Treated as a restricted tranche; must be used for the stated purpose or returned | Restricted funds are segregated as a named tranche in the treasury structure and cannot be co-mingled with general operating funds for disbursement purposes. --- ## 6. Worked Example — PP DAO Annual Budget Cycle The PP DAO (Point Preserve DAO, Santa Rosa Beach, FL) holds a combined treasury funded by STR revenue share and AI campus membership fees. The following is an illustrative annual allocation for planning year 2026. **Starting treasury balance:** $240,000 `(illustrative)` **Reserve floor (20%):** $48,000 — may not be allocated **Allocable pool:** $192,000 | Category | Amount | Tranche % | Gate | Lead Proposal | |---|---|---|---|---| | `infrastructure` — AI inference hardware refresh | $52,000 | 27% | Milestone (3 tranches) | `pp-dao-prop-2026-003` | | `contributor-rewards` — Site manager, tech lead, ops Q1–Q4 | $64,000 | 33% | Quarterly approval | `pp-dao-prop-2026-004` | | `retroactive-rewards` — 2025 pre-DAO platform build | $18,000 | 9% | Approval; no-self-vote | `pp-dao-prop-2026-005` | | `grants-and-partnerships` — EcoGuardian.AI data-share pilot | $12,000 | 6% | Board + ratification | `pp-dao-prop-2026-006` | | `governance-operations` — Legal opinion, audit tooling | $9,000 | 5% | Approval | `pp-dao-prop-2026-007` | | `reserve-building` — Additional reserve buffer | $18,000 | 9% | Auto on pass | `pp-dao-prop-2026-008` | | `unallocated` — Held for mid-year proposals | $19,000 | 10% | — | — | All figures are `(illustrative)`. The AI inference hardware refresh is the largest single allocation and uses a three-milestone structure: - **M1** ($18,000): Hardware ordered and delivered to 725 J D Miller Road — evidence: delivery receipt + asset tag. - **M2** ($22,000): Infrastructure operational, AI campus load test passed — evidence: benchmark report signed by Technical Lead. - **M3** ($12,000): 90-day uptime target met — evidence: monitoring dashboard export. If M3 is not met within 120 days of M2 sign-off, the $12,000 reverts to `unallocated`. --- ## 7. Treasury Health Indicators The Treasurer reports the following indicators at each governance review cycle (per `c9-governance-mechanisms-spec`): | Indicator | Target | Warning Signal | Escalation | |---|---|---|---| | Reserve ratio | ≥ 20% of treasury | < 20% | Freeze all non-emergency disbursements until restored | | Unallocated % | 8–15% | < 5% (over-committed) or > 30% (under-deployed) | Treasurer flags at next review; proposal required to correct | | Overdue milestone rate | < 10% of active milestones | > 20% | Steward Council review; affected proposals may be suspended | | Retroactive-reward overspend | 0 proposals exceed tranche ceiling | Any ceiling breach | Proposal void; must be re-submitted under correct tranche | --- ## 8. Cross-Reference Summary | Artifact | Relationship | |---|---| | `c9-decision-rights-matrix` | Defines the decision class and executor for each allocation type | | `c9-proposal-design-template` | Milestone tables and evidence requirements are embedded in proposal templates | | `c9-execution-accountability` | C11 producer; records each disbursement as a provenance event | | `c9-governance-mechanisms-spec` | Defines quorum rules that govern treasury-allocation votes | ## Usage Notes Populate the treasury tranche YAML block before the first proposal cycle opens. The reserve floor is a hard policy rule — tooling should check the post-disbursement balance before execution, not after. Any change to the reserve floor percentage or to the budget category ceilings requires a `treasury-allocation` proposal with a full-tranche impact statement; a change to the reserve-floor rule itself (the 20% minimum) requires a `contract-change` proposal because it is a governance-level policy constraint, not an operational parameter.